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31. Medieval Logic1
Medieval logic inherited the legacy of Aristotle: first, the logica vetus, 
Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, which together with some of 
Boethius’ works were all the logic the Latin West had to go on around 1100. 
Subsequently, over the following century, came the recovery of the logica 
nova: the rest of Aristotle’s Organon, all of which was available in Latin by 
1200. The medievals’ own original contribution began to be formulated from 
around 1150 and came to be known as the logica modernorum. It consisted 
of a theory of properties of terms (signification, supposition, appellation, am-
pliation, restriction etc.); a theory of consequences; a theory of insolubles; 
and a theory of obligations. This development was arguably stimulated by the 
theory of fallacy, following recovery of De Sophisticis Elenchis around 
1140.2
My focus will be on some logicians at the University of Oxford, mostly at 
Merton College, in the early fourteenth century, in particular, Walter Burley 
(or Burleigh), Richard Kilvington, Roger Swyneshed and William Heytesbury. 
I will contrast three different approaches to the theory of obligations found in 
these authors, and some of the reasons for these contrasts. The standard the-
ory of obligations, the responsio antiqua, was codified by Burley in a treatise 
composed in Oxford in 1302. Kilvington and Swyneshed objected strongly 
to certain aspects of Burley’s theory, and proposed their own revisions. Heytes-
bury reverted to the standard theory. These objections were often motivated 
by certain sophistical arguments, and in return, the discussion of sophisms in 
treatises on them such as Kilvington’s are ridden through with obligational 
terminology, as are other treatises such as those on insolubles. One such so-
phism is found in a short treatise (an abridgement, or perhaps an early version, 
of ch. 2 of Heytesbury’s Regulae) found in Oxford MS Can. lat. 278 f. 70r. 
The sophism occurs as part of an obligational casus. Burley’s solution to a 
related sophism raises wider issues of signification and truth, connected with 
1 Presented at the Conference on Illegitimate Argumentation in Western Intellectual Cul-
ture from St Anselm to Isaac Newton: Moscow, 5-8 September 2011. This work is supported 
by Research Grant AH/F018398/1 (Foundations of Logical Consequence) from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council, UK.
2 See [De Rijk, 1962].
4the diagnoses of the insolubles found in Bradwardine and Buridan, which 
I have discussed elsewhere and to which I will briefly allude.3
2. Obligations
Obligations were a species of disputation. Their purpose has been vari-
ously described as pedagogical exercises;
4 tools for solving sophisms and 
insolubles;5 experiments with counterfactual reasoning;6 a theory of belief 
revision;7 a theory of thought-experiments;8 a sophisticated theory of argu-
mentation and disputation;9 and games of consistency maintenance.10
I believe we should understand obligations as logical exercises, exercises 
in logical disputation. No record of any actual disputation, rather than discus-
sion of the theory of obligations, has survived. Nonetheless, the medieval 
philosophical literature is rife with reference to obligational terminology. In 
my view, we should accept what is said in perhaps the longest passage de-
scribing the purpose of obligational disputations that we have, found in an 
anonymous treatise of the 1330s, the De Arte Obligatoria in a Merton Col-
lege MS:11
3 See, e.g., [Read, 2002].
4 Contemporary treatises so describing obligations include those of Nicholas of Paris (see 
[Braakhuis, 1998]), Ralph Strode (see [Spade, 1977]), the anonymous Obligationes Parisienses 
(see De [Rijk, 1975]), and the anonymous De arte obligatoria (see [Kretzmann and Stump, 1985]). 
Modern scholars holding this view include Romuald Green [Green, 1963], Mary Anthony Brown 
[Brown, 1966], Charles Hamblin [Hamblin, 1970] and Jennifer Ashworth [Ashworth, 1985].
5 Contemporary treatises expressing this view include William of Sherwood, Tractatus 
Sorbonnensis de Petitionibus Contrariorum (in [De Rijk, 1976]). A modern exponent is Eleo-
nore Stump [Stump, 1981].
6 The only text where this view is expressed is, I believe, Richard Kilvington’s Sophis-
mata (see § 6 below). This interpretation has been advocated by Paul Spade [Spade, 1982] 
following a suggestion by Norman Kretzmann in an unpublished lecture (see [Spade, 
1982: 3 fn. 6]).
7 So argue [Lagerlund and Olsson, 2001].
8 According to Mikko Yrjo¨nsuuri [Yrjo¨nsuuri, 1993].
9 See [Hajo Keffer, 2001].
10 Suggested by Chris Martin [Martin, 1993], and defended by Catarina Dutilh Novaes 
[Dutilh Novaes, 2005].
11 [Kretzmann and Stump, 1985: 251]: “Haec ars informat respondentem ut advertat quid 
conceditur et negatur, ne duo repugnantia concedat infra idem tempus. Aristoteles enim in 
Elenchis docet arguentem multa proponere, ut de propositorum responsione ob multitudinem 
respondens non recolens redargueretur. A quo in parte haec ars ordinem traxit, ut advertentes 
5“This art trains the Respondent so that he pays attention to what is granted 
and denied, in order not to grant two incompatible things at the same time. 
For in De Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle teaches the arguer to put forward 
many things so that the Respondent who does not remember because of 
the large number may be refuted as regards his response to the things put 
forward. It is partly from this that the art has derived its structure, so that 
as long as we pay attention we may keep ourselves from being tricked. 
Just as it is important for a liar to have a good memory in order to make 
claims without asserting contraries, so for someone who is good at res-
ponding it is appropriate that he respond formally regarding the things ad-
mitted, granted and appropriately denied and remembered.”
Disputations played a large role in medieval teaching, and the terminolo-
gy of disputations, and of obligations, permeates the scholarly literature. In-
deed, we know from contemporary reports that disputations were frequently 
practiced as a way of training students. The prevalence of the terminology of 
obligations is good evidence that obligational disputations also played a large 
role in medieval pedagogical practice. It is also a practice from which we have 
much to gain in our philosophical understanding of logic.
3. The Responsio Antiqua
The classic account of obligations, the responsio antiqua, is found in the 
treatise on obligations by Walter Burley. He was born in Yorkshire, England, 
around 1275. We find him as Master of Arts at Merton College in Oxford Uni-
versity, by 1301. He wrote treatises on Suppositions and Obligations in 1302. 
He went to the University of Paris before 1310 and stayed there until 1326 or 
1327, when Edward III came to the throne of England. His most famous lo gic 
text is De Puritate Artis Logicae, a title best translated as ‘On the Essentials 
of the Art of Logic’, written in the mid-1320s.12 Burley was a member of the 
intellectual circle surrounding Richard de Bury, the Bishop of Durham. Re-
ports say that Bury had the largest private library in England at that time. Bur-
ley was envoy to the papal court for Edward III from 1327. His many works 
include commentaries on Aristotle. He died around 1344/5.
non indeceptos servemus. Sicut decet mendacem esse bene memorem ut non contraria licet 
affirmat asserat, ita bene respondentem iuxta admissa et concessa et nagata convenienter et 
memorata formaliter convenit respondere.”(P. 243).
12 On the translation of Burley’s title, see [Spade and Menn, 2003].
6An obligational disputation is a disputation between an Opponent and a 
Respondent. Burley distinguishes six types of obligation:13 Institutio (or Im-
positio), where the Respondent is obligated to use a term with a new mean-
ing; Petitio, where the Respondent is obligated to act in a certain way; Positio, 
where the Respondent is obligated to grant a particular proposition, the posi-
tum; Depositio, where the Respondent is obligated to deny a certain proposi-
tion, the depositum; Dubitatio, where the Respondent is obligated to doubt a 
given proposition, the dubitatum; and finally, Sit verum, where the Respond-
ent is obligated to respond as if he variously knew, doubted or was ignorant 
of the positum. The primary type, which takes up half of Burley’s treatise, is 
positio. Burley and earlier writers distinguish two types of positio, positio 
possibilis and positio impossibilis.
In positio the Opponent presents a casus, that is, a hypothetical background 
situation; a positum, that is, a proposition which may be accepted or rejected 
by the Respondent; and a sequence of propositions which may be granted, de-
nied or doubted (or in later texts, distinguished as ambiguous) by the Respond-
ent, according to the rules of positio. The obligation ends either when the Re-
spondent grants and denies the same proposition (or grants a contradiction), 
or when the Opponent says ‘cedat tempus’, i.e., time’s up. There may follow 
an analysis of how well the Respondent responded.
The basic rules of positio, according to the responsio antiqua, are as fol-
lows. In possible positio, the positum should be accepted only if it could be 
true. If the proposition follows from or is inconsistent with the positum and/
or something already granted/denied, it is said to be “relevant” (pertinens), 
otherwise “irrelevant” (impertinens). If it is relevant, it is “obligated” and 
should be granted if it follows (pertinens sequens), denied if it is inconsistent 
(pertinens repugnans), while if it’s irrelevant, it is not obligated and (in ac-
cord with the casus) should be granted if (known to be) true, denied if (known 
to be) false, and doubted if it is not known whether it is true or false.
Here is an example of possible positio:
0. Positum: ‘Every man is running’ Accepted
1. ‘Every man is running’ Granted (the positum)
2. ‘You are running’ Denied (irrelevant and false)
3. ‘You are a man’ Denied (true, but inconsistent with the positum 
and the opposite of what has been denied )
13 [Burley, 1988] contains an English translation of a little over half of Burley’s trea-
tise, edited in full in [Green, 1963].
7The early treatises, up until the time of Burley and Ockham, also accepted 
impossible positio, where the positum is impossible. However, the positum 
must not be explicitly contradictory; it must be credible. E.g., ‘God is not 
God’, or ‘A man is an ass’ can be accepted.14 Not every consequence should 
be granted; e.g., in impossible positio one must not use the “rule of the 
Adamites”,15 viz that from the impossible anything follows, nor the rule that 
what is necessary follows from anything. But one can use syllogistic infer-
ences and rules of transposition. Ockham says that “by such positio one opens 
the way to recognising which inferences are good and self-evident and which 
are not.”16
Catarina Dutilh Novaes [2007, p. 161] has argued that the Respondent al-
ways has a winning strategy, at least in possible positio. The reason is Lin-
denbaum’s Lemma, that any consistent set of propositions has a maximal con-
sistent extension.17 The construction in Lindenbaum’s Lemma is very similar 
to the way an obligational disputation develops. We start with the casus to-
gether with the positum. These will often be inconsistent, but if the positum 
is impossible it should be rejected. Let Π be the set of common knowledge, 
amended in light of the casus; let p0 be the positum; and let Σ0 = {p0}. Then 
consider each proposition pn+1 in turn: 
14 See, e.g., [De Ockham, 1974: III-3 c. 42]: “Impossible positio is when some impossible 
proposition is posited. It must be realised that it is often useful to posit an impossible proposi-
tion and to accept an inference in which an impossible proposition is inferred from another 
impossible one. For example, it is useful to posit this proposition, ‘A man is capable of braying’ 
and to make this inference: ‘If a man is an ass, a man is capable of braying’. Similarly, it is 
useful to posit this proposition, ‘God is not God’ and to make this inference: ‘If there is no God, 
God is not God’... [or] ...‘God is not three persons, so God is not God’.” (“Positio impossibilis 
est quando ponitur aliqua propositio impossibilis. Et sciendum est quod multum refert ponere 
unam propositionem impossibilem et accipere unam consequentiam in qua unum impossibile 
infertur ex alio impossibili. Sicut multum refert ponere istam propositionem ‘homo est rudibilis’ 
et inferre istam consequentiam ‘si homo est asinus, homo est rudibilis’. Similiter multum refert 
ponere istam propositionem ‘Deus non est Deus’ et inferre istam consequentiam ‘si Deus non 
est, Deus non est Deus’ ... ‘Deus non est tres personae, igitur Deus non est Deus’.”) As a nega-
tive proposition, ‘God is not God’ is true if its subject term is empty.
15 See [Anonymous, 2001: 218]. Adam of Balsham taught at the school of the Petit Pont 
in Paris in the 12th century, and became famous for the argument that anything follows from a 
contradiction. See, e.g., [Martin, 1986: 571].
16 [De Ockham, 1974: III-3 c. 42 P. 741]: “Per talem enim positionem aperitur via ad scien-
dum quae consequentiae sunt bonae et evidentes et quae non sunt evidentes.”
17 See, e.g., [Mendelson, 1979: 66-7] Lemma 2.11.
8• If pn+1 is pertinens sequens (i.e., Σn ܂
 
pn+1), pn+1 is consistent with Σn, so by 
the rules pn+1 ∈
 
Σn+1 and Σn+1 is consistent if Σn is
• if pn+1 is pertinens repugnans (i.e., Σn
 
܂
 
 ¬pn+1), pn+1 is not consistent with 
Σn, so by the rules ¬pn+1 ∈
 
Σn+1 and Σn+1 is consistent if Σn is
• if pn+1 is impertinens, then by the rules pn+1 ∈
 
Σn+1 if and only if pn+1 ∈ Π
Note that Σn may well be inconsistent with Π (over consequences of ac-
cepting p0). But since pn+1 is impertinens only if pn+1 is consistent with Σn, the 
obligational rules guarantee that Σn is consistent for all n. Note in particular 
that the construction, as in Lindenbaum’s Lemma, is entirely syntactic, build-
ing a set of propositions Σn. There is no reference to any semantic interpreta-
tion or model. 
4. Other Types of Obligation
Burley describes five other types of obligation. The first he mentions is 
institutio, sometimes called impositio.18 For example, let A signify ‘man’ in a 
false proposition, ‘ass’ in a true proposition and the disjunctive term ‘a man 
or not a man’ in a doubtful proposition:
1. ‘You are A’ ???
2. Cedat tempus
This places you in a dilemma. For either you are A or not. If you are A, 
‘You are A’ is true and irrelevant, so you should grant it when under the obli-
gation, and then A signifies ‘ass’, so you would grant that you are an ass. If 
you are not A, ‘You are A’ is false and irrelevant, so you should deny it when 
under the obligation, and then A signifies ‘man’, so you would deny that you 
are a man. If you doubt it, you doubt it when under the obligation, and then 
A signifies ‘man or not man’, so you would doubt whether you are a man or 
not.
18 See, e.g., [Spade, 1977: §III, P. 258].
9Burley’s response is:
“An institutio should never be accepted when what the proposition signifies 
depends on the truth or falsity of the proposition in which it is used.”19
The second type of obligation that Burley describes is petitio. For exam-
ple, suppose that I require (peto) you to grant that a man is an ass (§2.05):
1. ‘You grant that a man is an ass’ ???
2. Cedat tempus
If you grant this, you grant what is false when not obligated to do so, so 
you responded badly. If you deny it, you were obliged to grant that a man is 
an ass and you’ve denied it, so you responded badly. Burley’s solution (§2.13) 
is that you should deny ‘You grant that a man is an ass’, for you were obli-
gated to grant that a man is an ass, not to grant that you grant that a man is an 
ass. Petitio can be subsumed under positio. For example, instead of requiring 
that you grant p, simply posit ‘You grant p’.
Depositio in the mirror image of positio. Once accepted, the depositum 
should always be denied. Since it should always be denied, whatever implies 
the depositum must also be denied.20 E.g.,21
0.  Depositum: ‘You respond badly or you
should deny that you respond badly’ 
Accepted (call it A)
1. ‘A is deposited to you’ Granted (irrelevant and true)
2. ‘You should deny A’ Granted (follows from1)
3. ‘You should deny that you respond badly’ ???
4. Cedat tempus
19 [Burley 1988: §1.02]; cf. [Green, 1963: II P. 35]: “Numquam est institutio admittenda 
ubi significatum vocis dependet ex veritate vel falsitate propositionis in qua ponitur.” Sw-
yneshed’s response, according to the responsio nova that we will consider in §8 below, is to 
accept the obligation and deny ‘You are A’. See [Spade, 1977: §40]. For although A signifies 
‘man’ in a false proposition and ‘You are A’ is false, and it would follow that you deny you are 
a man (that is, grant that ‘You are A’ is false), you can deny the conjunctive antecedent while 
granting the conjuncts.
20 Obviously, one should accept the depositum only if its falsehood is consistent with the 
casus.
21 [Green, 1963: II P. 89] (§4.24).
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If you grant (3), you grant something that implies the depositum, contrary 
to the rule for depositio. If you deny it, you deny something that follows from 
what you have granted, viz ‘You should deny A’, for you should deny the parts 
of any disjunction you should deny.
Burley’s solution (§4.25) is that ‘A is deposited to you’ should have been 
denied at line 1, for it already implies the depositum, and is not irrelevant. 
That is, ‘A is deposited to you’ implies that you should deny A. So you should 
deny that you respond badly. So either you respond badly or you should deny 
that you respond badly, which is the depositum.
Dubitatio is, as the name implies, a species of obligation in which the du-
bitatum, the obligatum, should be doubted. Hence:22
“One must respond to the dubitatum, what is equivalent to it, what is con-
tradictory to it, what is false and follows from it, and what is true and implies 
it, by saying one is in doubt.” E.g., suppose Socrates is white and that you 
know this.2324
0. Dubitatum: ‘Socrates is white’ Accepted
1. ‘You are in doubt whether Socrates is white’ Denied (irrelevant and 
 known to be false)
2. ‘You know that Socrates is white’ Denied (implies the dubitatum)24
3. ‘Socrates is not white’ ???
4. Cedat tempus
If you grant (3), you grant the opposite of the dubitatum. If you deny it, 
you deny something that follows from the opposites of what has been denied, 
for the contradictory of (3) and the contradictory of (2) imply (1), so the con-
tradictory of (1) and the contradictory of (2) imply (3).
Burley’s solution is that ‘You are in doubt whether Socrates is white’ should 
have been doubted at line 1, for it cannot be granted, since it is false and known 
22 [Burley, 1988: §5.05]; cf. [Green, 1963: II P. 90]: “Ad dubitatum et ad suum convertibile 
et ad suum contradictorium et ad suum consequens, si sit falsum, et ad suum antecedens, si sit 
verum, respondendum est dubie.”
23 [Burley, 1988: §5.07].
24 Burley says that (2) should be denied because it implies the dubitatum. But that is only 
why it cannot be granted. It cannot be doubted since that was ruled out at line 1.
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to be false, and it cannot be denied, since its denial implies the contradictory 
of (2) which together imply (3), the opposite of the dubitatum.
The final species of obligation is Sit Verum (‘Let it be true’), which Burley 
describes as follows:25
“It is usually said that sit verum creates an obligation on a mental state, and 
since mental states are of three kinds, namely, the states of knowledge, of 
doubt and of ignorance, this obligation is of three kinds, either through a verb 
of knowing, or through a verb of doubting, or through a verb of ignorance. 
For example, ‘Let it be true that you know you are running’, or ‘Let it be true 
that you doubt you are running’.”
Again, sit verum, like petitio, can be subsumed under positio. For example, 
instead of letting it be true that you don’t know whether p, simply posit ‘You 
don’t know whether p’.
5. Problems with the Responsio Antiqua
Burley observes that in possible positio, the Respondent can be forced to 
grant any other false proposition compatible with the positum. E.g., to prove 
you are a bishop:26
0. Positum: ‘You are in Rome’ Accepted (possible)
1.  ‘You are not in Rome or you are 
a bishop’ 
Granted (irrelevant and
 the fi rst disjunct is true)
2. ‘You are a bishop’ Granted (follows from the positum and 
what 
 was granted)
25 [Green, 1963: II P. 94-5] (§6.01): “Ideo dicitur communiter qoud ‘sit verum’ obligat ad 
statum mentis, et cum triplex sit status animae, scilicet, status scientis, dubitantis et ignorantis, 
tripliciter fit haec obligatio, aut per verbum sciendi, aut per verbum dubitandi, aut per verbum 
ignorandi. Verbi gratia: sit verum te scire te currere; vel: sit verum te dubitare te currere.”
26 [Burley, 1988: §3.61].
12
Or the trick (cautela – [Green, 1963: §3.145]) can be pulled like this 
(§3.62):
0. Positum: ‘You are in Rome’ Accepted
1.  ‘ “You are in Rome” and
“You are a bishop” are
alike in truth-value’
Granted (irrelevant and
true – they are both
false)
2. ‘You are a bishop’ Granted (follows from
the positum and what
was granted)
 
Moreover, Burley’s theory is dynamic – the response can depend on the 
order in which propositions are proposed: e.g.,
0. Positum: ‘You are in Rome’ Accepted
1. ‘You are a bishop’  Denied (irrelevant and false)
2.  ‘ “You are in Rome” and
“You are a bishop” are
alike in truth-value’
Denied (inconsistent with the positum and
 the opposite of what has been denied)
Recall that in the previous example, when proposed in the opposite order, 
(1) and (2) were granted. Indeed, responses can change (§3.87):
0.  Positum: ‘The king is sitting
 or you are running’ 
Accepted
1. ‘The king is sitting’ Doubted (irrelevant and unknown)
2. ‘You are running’   Denied (irrelevant and false)
3. ‘The king is sitting’ Granted (follows from the positum
 and the opposite of what has 
been denied)
However, although what has been doubted can later be granted or denied, 
grant can never turn into denial or vice versa.
13
Burley emphasizes that “all responses must be for the same instant.” (§3.84) 
For suppose at the start of the obligation, you are sitting, but having granted 
the irrelevant proposition ‘You are sitting’, you then stand up. Should you 
now deny ’You are sitting’ ? If so, you have denied something you earlier 
granted, and so you have responded badly. But if you grant it, you may have 
granted something irrelevant and false, and again you have responded badly. 
Burley’s answer is that you should grant it, even though it is now false, for it 
was true when you granted it, and “all responses must be for the same in-
stant.”
It was usual to take the instant to be the start of the obligation. Suppose 
we call the instant A (§3.82):
0. Positum: ‘The Antichrist exists’ Accepted
1. ‘The Antichrist exists at A’ Denied (the Antichrist exists 
 only in the future)
2. ‘It is A’ Denied (inconsistent with the
 positum and the opposite 
 of what has been denied)
However, although we must deny that it is A, that does not mean that ‘It 
is A’ is false. We are often obliged to grant falsehoods and deny truths.
Pragmatic inconsistency results from the following obligational sophism 
(§3.17):
0. Positum: ‘Nothing is posited to you’ Accepted
1.  ‘Everything that follows
from the positum must be
granted’
Granted (it’s a rule)
2. ‘Something follows from the positum’ Granted (follows from
what has been granted)
3. ‘Something was posited to you’ ???
4. Cedat tempus
14
If you grant it, you grant the opposite of the positum, so you respond bad-
ly. If you deny it, you deny something that follows, so again you respond 
badly. Burley says (§3.19) that step 1 should be denied: the rule is that if some-
thing follows from the positum it should be granted.
6. The Oxford Calculators
Many writers disliked the dynamic nature of Burley’s theory and the fact 
that responses could change, including Richard Kilvington, one of the Oxford 
Calculators. Kilvington was the son of a priest from the diocese of York (prob-
ably in Kilvington, near Thirsk). He was Master of Arts in 1324-5, probably 
at Oriel College, and wrote his Sophismata in the mid-1320s. He was Doctor 
of Theology by 1335, and also a member of Richard de Bury’s household and 
active in circle of Edward III. Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, 1354, he died in 
a second phase of the Black Death in 1361.
The Oxford (or Mertonian) Calculators were a group of mathematical 
physicists, many working at Merton College, from the early 1320s until the 
height of the Black Death in 1348-9. Their main interest was natural philoso-
phy, but treated in the context of logical disputations: beginning, ceasing, mo-
tion, velocity, calculation, infinity, continuity.
Kilvington’s Sophismata is replete with the terminology of disputations, 
in particular, obligational terms (grant, deny, doubt). Take his 47th sophism. 
First, he shows that you know that the king is seated:27
0.  Positum: If the king is seated, you know that
the king is seated, and if the king is not seated,
you know that the king is not seated
Accepted (possible)
1.  Either you know he is seated or you
know he is not
Granted (follows from the 
positum given Excluded 
Middle)
2. You know that the king is not seated   Denied (irrelevant and false)
3. You know that the king is seated   Granted (follows from 1
and the opposite of 2)
27 [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990b: S 47 c].
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Then, from the same positum, he shows that you do not know that the king 
is seated (S47 d):
1´.  Either you know he is seated or you
know he is not
Granted (as before)
2´. You know that the king is seated Denied (irrelevant and false)
3´. You know that the king is not seated Granted (follows from 1´
and the opposite of 2´)
4´. You do not know that the king is seated Granted (follows from 3´)
We appear to have contradicted ourselves.
Kilvington considers three different responses to the sophism. The third 
response seems to consist in refusing to accept the positio. Kilvington rejects 
this response. The second response is Kilvington’s preferred response – more 
below. Before he comes to that, Kilvington notes that in the second stage of 
the proof, at line 2´, we denied what we had already granted at line 3 in the 
first proof. So we should then have granted ‘You know the king is seated’ as 
pertinens sequens, and the second proof would have failed. Hence we should 
grant the sophism (i.e., ‘You know the king is seated’: S47 e):
0.  Positum: ‘If the king is seated, you know that
the king is seated, and if the king is not seated,
you know that the king is not seated’
Accepted
1. ‘Either you know he is seated or you know he is not’ Granted
2. ‘You know that the king is not seated’ Denied
 (irrelevant and false)
3. ‘You know that the king is seated’ Granted (follows from 1 
 and the opposite of 2)
4. ‘You do not know that the king is seated’ Denied
 (incompatible with 3)
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Kilvington rejects this response: if we had given the second proof first, he 
says, this response would then instruct us to deny the sophism (S47 f ):
0.  Positum: ‘If the king is seated,
you know that the king is seated,
and if the king is not seated,
you know that the king is not seated’ 
Accepted
1.  ‘Either you know he is seated or
you know he is not’
Granted
2. ‘You know that the king is seated’ Denied (irrelevant and false)
3. ‘You know that the king is not seated’ Granted
 (follows from 1 and the opposite 
of 2)
4. ‘You know that the king is seated’  Denied (incompatible with 3)
In Kilvington’s solution to this sophism, he revises what he calls the “com-
mon usage” of the notion of irrelevant proposition (loquendo de impertinen-
ti ut communiter sumitur). He focuses on Burley’s “trick” for making the re-
spondent grant any other false compatible proposition (S47 q):28
“Thus I say as regards a familiar example, ... that when ‘You are in Rome’ 
has been posited, it is not the case that anything false that is compatible 
with it can be proved, such as ‘You are a bishop’ and the like. And the rea-
son is that once it is posited that you are in Rome, you would not grant 
this: ‘“You are in Rome” and “You are a bishop” are alike [in truth-value]’ 
unless you were a bishop.”
That is, according to Mikko Yrjönsuuri’s interpretation,29 Kilvington pro-
poses that one should respond to irrelevant propositions not by reference to 
their actual truth-value (as far as we know it), but to what their truth-value 
would be if the positum were true. The upshot is that how one responds does 
28 Cf. [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990a]: “Unde dico – in communi exemplo, ut facilius 
intelligatur – quod posita ista ‘Tu es Romae’, non contingit probare aliquod falsum sibi com-
possibile, ut istam: ‘Tu es episcopus’, et similia. Et causa est quia posito quod tu esses Romae, 
non concederes istam ‘“Tu es Romae” et “Tu es episcopus” sunt similia’ nisi fores episcopus.”
29 [Yrjönsuuri, 1994: 121].
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not depend on intervening responses, and so not on their order, but only on 
the positum.
Kretzmann and Spade’s theory of obligations as experiments in counter-
factual reasoning has some plausibility in describing Kilvington’s theory. None-
theless, I think it is certainly wrong as a general account of obligations in 
other authors, such as Burley. Moreover, I think it is also a misunderstanding 
of Kilvington’s approach. What Kilvington is doing is to use the practice of 
obligations as a method of proof and disproof in sophisms, as noted by Stump. 
The theory of obligations, as we find it in Burley (the responsio antiqua) is 
unsuited for this task. For example, Kilvington is fond of a type of reasoning 
called by Yrjönsuuri [Yrjönsuuri, 1994: 130] (following Kretzmann) “the dis-
putational meta-argument”:
This inference is (known to be) valid
The premises are in doubt
So the conclusion cannot be denied.
For if one denies the conclusion of a valid argument (which one knows to 
be valid), one must deny at least one of the premises, so the premises (as a 
whole) cannot be in doubt. But this is inconsistent with Burley’s rules, as we 
saw where the Respondent can be led to deny something he had earlier doubt-
ed. We have no record of Kilvington’s theory of obligations other than what 
we can infer from the rather oblique remarks he makes in the final pages of 
the Sophismata. But Kilvington uses this disputational meta-argument again 
and again throughout Sophisms 45-48, for example (S47 i):
0.  Positum: ‘If the king is seated, you know that the king is 
seated’ Accepted 
1. ‘The king is seated’ Doubted
2. ‘You know that the king is seated’ ???
According to Burley’s rules, 2 should be denied as irrelevant and false (for 
although it follows from 0 and 1, 1 was not granted). However, the disputa-
tional meta-argument says 2 should not be denied, since it follows validly 
from 0 and 1, and 1 has been doubted. Kilvington writes (S47 i):30
30 My own translation. Cf. [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990a]: “Si immediate post posi-
tionem casus proponeretur ista ‘Rex sedet’, ista foret dubitanda a te. Igitur cum haec propositio 
‘Tu scis regem sedere’ sit consequens ad istam ut nunc ‘Rex sedet’ per casum, igitur si pro 
eodem instanti proponeretur tibi haec propositio ‘Tu scis regem sedere’, ista non foret a te 
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“If immediately after the positing of the hypothesis, ‘The king is seated’ 
were proposed, it should be doubted by you. Then, since ‘You know that 
the king is seated’ is a consequence, by the hypothesis, of ‘The king is 
seated’, therefore, if ‘You know that the king is seated’ is proposed to you 
for the same instant, it should not be denied. For otherwise it would fol-
low that for some instant of the response there would be a good conse-
quence and the antecedent should be doubted and the consequent denied, 
which is clearly not consistent.”
Kilvington’s solution is that we should express doubt about ‘You know the 
king is seated’ as well as about ‘The king is seated’. He explains this by dis-
tinguishing two senses of ‘doubt’. Note that we can clearly contrast ‘granted’ 
(concedenda) with (known to be) ‘true’ (vera/scita), and ‘denied’ (neganda) 
with (known to be) ‘false’ (falsa/nescita). Kilvington is pointing to similar 
contrast between dubitanda and dubia: just because I am obliged to express 
doubt about something doesn’t mean I do actually doubt it. Hence, one can-
not infer from an obligation to express doubt about something that one doesn’t 
know it (S47 dd):31
“It does not follow that because the proposition ‘The king is seated’ should 
be doubted by me (a me dubitanda) that the proposition is in doubt for me 
(mihi dubia) … Nor does it follow that because this proposition should be 
doubted by me that it is not known by me.”
In the present case, ‘You know the king is seated’ should be doubted (du-
bitanda), that is, one should express doubt about it, even though you know 
the king is seated (if he is). Just as one often has to grant a proposition which 
one knows to be false (or about which one is in doubt), or deny one that one 
knows to be true (or again, about which one is in doubt), so too one may have 
to express doubt about a proposition that one knows to be true (or to be false). 
He writes (S47 dd-ee):32
neganda. Consequentiam probo; quia aliter sequeretur quod pro aliquo instanti responsionis 
aliqua consequentia foret bona, et antecedens foret dubitandum et consequens negandum – 
quod non apparet conveniens.”
31 Cf. [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990a]: “Nec sequitur ‘Haec proposito “Rex sedet” est 
a me dubitanda; igitur haec proposito “Rex sedet” est mihi dubia’ ... non sequitur ‘Haec propo-
sitio est dubitanda a me; igitur haec propositio non est scita a me’.” Stump appears to misunder-
stand Kilvington’s point when she writes [Stump, 1989: 223]: “The point of S47 is to justify the 
apparently paradoxical claim ... that one may doubt and know the same proposition.”
32 Cf. [Kretzmann and Kretzmann, 1990a]: “Quia propositio est dubitanda in casu quando 
scitur, et ideo est dubitanda aliquando quando nescitur a me utrum sciatur ... Ad argumentum 
concedendum est quod tu scis regem sedere vel tu scis regem non sedere. Sed minor coas-
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“For [sometimes] a proposition must be doubted when it is known, and 
sometimes it must be doubted when it is not known whether it is known 
...To the argument, it must be granted that you know that the king is sitting 
or you know that the king is not sitting. But the minor premise that was 
joined to it, namely, ‘You do not know that the king is not seated’, must 
be doubted. For if the king is seated, you do not know that the king is not 
seated (by the hypothesis), and the antecedent [‘The king is seated’] must 
be doubted, so the consequent must be doubted too.”
William Heytesbury rejected Kilvington’s revision of the obligational rules. 
Heytesbury was another of the Oxford Calculators. Fellow of Merton College 
by 1330, he composed his Rules for Solving Sophisms 1335. During the 1330s 
he also wrote a treatise on On Compounded and Divided Senses, a collection 
of Sophismata, another called Sophismata Asinina where each sophism is tai-
lored to establish the paradoxical conclusion, ‘You are an ass’, and the peda-
gogical treatise on consequences, Iuxta Hunc Textum. He was Doctor of The-
ology by 1348 and Chancellor of the University of Oxford from 1352 till per-
haps 1354 and again from 1370-2. He died in 1372-3.
At the end of his treatise ‘On Compounded and Divided Senses’, Heytes-
bury considers the now-familiar example:33
“It often happens ... that a proposition is altogether irrelevant when pro-
posed in the first place but relevant enough in the second and third place 
... For example, let this disjunctive proposition be posited: ‘The king is 
seated or you are in Rome.’ If the proposition ‘The king is seated’ is then 
proposed, it must be doubted since it is doubtful and irrelevant. Let the 
proposition ‘You are in Rome’ be proposed then. Since it is false and ir-
relevant, it must be denied. And if ‘The king is seated’ is then proposed 
again, it must be granted; for it follows from the positum together with the 
opposite of [a proposition] that was correctly denied.”
sumpta est dubitanda – scilicet, haec: ‘Tu non scis regem non sedere’. Quia si rex sedet, tu 
non scis regem non sedere – per casum – et antecedens est dubitandum; igitur consequens est 
dubitandum.”
33 [Kretzmann and Stump,1988: 432-4]. Cf. [Heytesbury, 1494: f. 4rb]: “Accidit tamen 
frequenter quod propositio primo loco posita est impertinens omnino: sed in secundo et tertio 
loco satis pertinens est ... Verbi gratia: ponatur ista disiunctiva. rex sedet vel tu es rome: tunc si 
proponatur illa. rex sedet: cum ipsa sit dubitanda et impertinens debet dubitari. Deinde propo-
natur illa. tu es rome. cum ipsa sit falsa et impertinens debet negari. et tunc si proponatur iterum 
ista. rex sedet. debet concedi cum ipsa sit sequens ex posito cum opposito bene negati.”
20
Again, in ch. 2 of his Regulae, ‘De Scire et Dubitare’ (‘On “Know” and 
“Doubt”’), he addresses Kilvington’s revision directly. He presents the follow-
ing argument in the mouth of an opponent:34 
“For you could not then correctly deny that you know the king to be in 
London, because, according to you, this follows: ‘The king is in London, 
and you believe unhesitatingly that the king is in London; therefore, you 
know that the king is in London.’ The major premise is in doubt for you, 
and the minor is the hypothesis; therefore, the consequent is not to be de-
nied by you.”
This is an instance of Kilvington’s meta-argument:
0. Positum: ‘You believe unhesitatingly that king is in London Accepted
1. ‘The king is in London’ Doubted
2. ‘You know that the king is in London’ ???
Heytesbury’s response is that it must be denied since it is false and irrel-
evant. Thus Heytesbury explicitly rejects Kilvington’s revision.
7. The Closure Principle
In a MS held in the Bodleian,35 we find a short treatise entitled ‘Casus Ob-
ligationis’ attributed to Heytesbury. It presents five casus corresponding to 
five of the seven in ‘De Scire et Dubitare’. They correspond to arguments 2, 
4, 5, 6 and 7 in ‘De Scire’. The first and longest argument in ‘De Scire’ does 
not appear, where, as we have seen, Heytesbury directly tackles Kilvington’s 
proposed revision to the response to irrelevant propositions, and rejects his 
disputational meta-argument. Arguments 2, 5 and 7 are versions of the Hood-
ed Man,36 and are diagnosed as confounding the compounded sense with the 
34 [Kretzmann and Stump, 1988: 447]. Cf. [Heytesbury, 1494: f. 13vb]: “Non enim poteris 
tunc bene negare quod tu scis regem esse londonis, quia sequitur per te: rex est londonis et 
credis absque hesitatione quod rex est londonis, igitur scis quod rex est londonis. Maior est tibi 
dubia et minor est casus, igitur consequens non est a te negandum.”
35 Oxford Bodleian MS Canon. lat. 278, f. 70r .
36 See Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis ch. 24 (179b1-4): “In the case of the man ap-
proaching, or the hooded man, ‘to be approaching’ is not the same as ‘to be Coriscus’, so that 
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divided sense. For example, in 5, the last case, even if there is nothing you 
doubt to be human (the divided sense), one can still doubt ‘This is human’ (the 
compounded sense). In argument 6, the casus is rejected as contradictory. Fi-
nally, we come to the third argument, argument 4, which seems to turn on the 
closure of signification under consequence. The reasoning is much clearer in 
the shorter version, where Heytesbury is seen to reject the suggestion that sig-
nification is closed under consequence.37
He writes:38
“I admit all of [the objection] up to the claim that I know the proposition 
‘This is Socrates’ signifies precisely that this is Socrates or that this is Pla-
to. I deny that. Nor does it signify in this way primarily and principally. In-
stead, it primarily and principally signifies that this is Socrates.”
That this is Socrates or Plato does indeed follow from this being Socrates. 
But Heytesbury refuses to accept that ‘This is Socrates’ signifies, at least pri-
marily and principally, that this is Socrates or Plato.
That signification is closed under consequence, and that Upward T- Infer-
ence must accordingly be qualified, was the basis of Thomas Bradwardine’s 
iconoclastic solution to the insolubles in the early 1320s.39 Heytesbury distin-
guishes a proposition’s signifying “as its words usually suggest” (“sicut ver-
ba illius communiter pretendunt”)40 and its signifying such and such precise-
ly, and followed Bradwardine in claiming that no proposition can precisely 
signify its own falsehood.41 Suppose Socrates says ‘Socrates says what is false’ 
and nothing else. ‘Socrates says what is false’ certainly signifies that Socrates 
says what is false as the words usually suggest, primarily and principally. Yet 
it can’t signify only that, but must signify more. Casting his account of insol-
suppose I know Coriscus, but do not know the man who is approaching, it still isn’t the case 
that I both know and do not know the same man.”
37 This casus (or sophism) is discussed by Spencer Johnston in his paper ‘“This is So-
crates”: a Mertonian sophism about signification’ in this volume.
38 [Kretzmann and Stump, 1988: 460]. Cf. [Heytesbury, 1494: f. 15rb] regulae: “Admitto 
totum usque ad hoc quod dicitur quod scio quod haec propositio hoc est sortes significat pre-
cise quod hoc est sortes vel quod hoc est plato. Illam nego, nec illa primo et principaliter sic 
precise significat. Sed primo et principaliter significat quod hoc est sortes.”
39 See [Bradwardine, 2010] and [Read, 2002]. Upward T-Inference is the principle that a 
proposition is true if things are as it says they are, so called by [Maudlin, 2004: 112].
40 [Heytesbury, 1494: f. 6ra]. Spade’s translation reads: “as its words commonly pretend”: 
[Heytesbury, 1979: §§44-45, P. 46].
41 See [Bradwardine, 2010: ad A.4.3].
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ubles in the language of obligations, Heytesbury claims that one is under no 
obligation to say what it signifies precisely:42
“[Assume] that Socrates says only ‘Socrates says what is false’ ... If some-
one asks under this casus what the proposition uttered in this way by Soc-
rates signified other than that Socrates is saying what is false, I say to him 
that the Respondent does not have to solve or to give his determination for 
that question. For from the casus it follows that the proposition signifies 
otherwise than that Socrates is saying what is false, but the casus does not 
specify what that is; hence, the Respondent does not have to give any fur-
ther determination for that question.”
Bradwardine was clear what else insolubles signified, namely, their own 
truth. Heytesbury, writing some ten years later, is more cautious, and refuses 
to be drawn on what else insolubles signify. Nonetheless, he agrees, they can-
not signify precisely what the words usually suggest. Robert Fland, writing 
some years after Heytesbury, contrasts these two approaches:43
“There are two theories [of insolubles] which claim that an insoluble sig-
nifies other than things are. The first claims that an insoluble signifies 
other than things are and specifies what its secondary signification is. The 
second theory claims that an insoluble signifies other than things are (but) 
the respondent does not have to specify what it signifies that is other than 
things are.”
Fland thinks these two theories are equally good and both better than any 
other response to the insolubles (§15). The first view (clearly Bradwardine’s) 
says that insolubles are implicitly conjunctive, signifying in addition to their 
primary and principal signification their own truth. The second view (clearly 
Heytesbury’s) says that, faced by, e.g., the proposition ‘A is not true’, which 
is itself A, one need not specify what A signifies other than that A is not true, 
although one must grant that it does not signify precisely that A is not true. It 
must signify more than that, and everything it signifies must obtain in order 
42 [Heytesbury, 1979: §§50, 51]. Cf. [Heytesbury, 1494: f. 6va]: “Supposito quod Sortes 
solummodo dicat illam propositionem: sortes dicit falsum ... Si autem queratur in isto casu quid 
significavit ista propositio sic dicta a sorte aliter quam quod sortes dicit falsum: huic dicitur 
quod respondens non habet istam questionem solvere seu determinare: quia ex casu sequitur 
quod illa propositio aliter significat quam quod sortes dicit falsum: sed casus non certificat quid 
illud sit ideo non habet respondens quesitum illud ulterius determinare.”
43 [Spade, 1978: §8, P. 63]: “Unde duae sunt positiones quae ponunt quod insolubile signi-
ficat aliter quam est. Prima ponit positio quod insolubile significat aliter quam est et certificat 
quae est sua significatio secundaria. Secunda positio ponit quod insolubile significat aliter 
quam est; respondens non habet certificare quid significat aliter quam est.”
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for it to be true. Nonetheless, Heytesbury refuses to follow Bradwardine in 
using the closure principle to discover what more it signifies, that is, what it 
signifies precisely or secondarily.
8. The Responsio Nova
In his treatise on ‘Obligations’, Fland tells us that there was a different 
way of responding to obligations, a “new response”, the “responsio nova.”44 
He gives an example:
0. Positum: ‘Every man is running’  Accepted
1. ‘Every man is running’ Granted (the positum)
2. ‘You are a man’ Granted (irrelevant and true)
3. ‘You are running’ Denied (false and irrelevant)
Why is ‘You are running’ irrelevant? Not because it does not follow from 
the positum and what has been granted. He says it does. But he denies that the 
conjunction of (1) and (2) should be granted, that is, one can deny a conjunc-
tion both of whose conjuncts have been granted:45
“This [new] response puts forward these two rules. The first is: A conjunc-
tion may be denied each of whose parts should be granted. The second is that 
a disjunction may be granted each of whose parts should be denied.”
Jennifer Ashworth [1986] shows that the author of the responsio nova was 
Roger Swyneshed. Indeed, Paul of Venice plays on the name, speaking of op-
pinionem illorum quos porcinos vocat (“the opinion of those whom he [the 
master he is criticizing] calls ‘swinish’).”46
Roger Swyneshed (or Suisset) is not to be confused with the better-known 
Merton Calculator, Richard Swyneshed (or Swineshead). Roger Swyneshed 
studied at Oxford under Thomas Bradwardine and Richard Kilvington. He 
wrote treatises on Insolubles and Obligations between 1330 and 1335 (and 
44 [Spade, 1980: §14, P. 45]: “Est tamen una alia responsio quasi nova ... ”
45 [Spade, 1980: §17]: “Une illa responsio ponit tales duas regulas. Prima est: Utraque pars 
copulativae est concedenda, quae copulativa est neganda. Secunda est quod disjunctiva est 
concedenda cujus utraque pars est neganda.”
46 [Paul of Venice, 1988: 323].
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also a treatise on Consequences now apparently lost). He was the author of 
Descriptiones motuum (or De motibus naturalibus), a treatise on natural chang-
es, including locomotion. Subsequently, he became Master of Theology (though 
his Sentences-lectures seem not to have survived). He too was a member of 
Richard de Bury’s circle, and a Benedictine monk of Glastonbury. He died 
about 1365. The following touching epigram has been preserved:
Subtle Swyneshed, denizen of Glastonbury, 
Indeed a monk of fond memory,
Whose fame of industry has not perished, 
Suffered the poor to live in peace.47
In his treatise on Obligationes, Swyneshed presents the two striking the-
ses mentioned by Fland:48
“Having granted the parts of a conjunction, the conjunction need not be 
granted, nor having granted a disjunction, need either of its parts be grant-
ed.”
Yet in an obligational disputation, one must normally grant whatever fol-
lows from what has already been granted. What is Swyneshed’s new theory 
of obligations? Why does Swyneshed offer a new theory? Is Swyneshed’s 
theory a logical heresy?
Fland’s central example continues like this:49
0. Positum: ‘Every man is running’ Accepted
1. ‘Every man is running’ Granted (the positum)
2. ‘You are a man’   Granted (irrelevant and true)
3. ‘You are running’   Denied (irrelevant and false)
4.  ‘Every man is running and you
are a man, so you are running’
Granted (since it is valid)
5. ‘Every man is running and you are a man’ Denied (irrelevant and false)
47 From Richard Trevytlam OFM, De laude universitatis Oxoniae, in [Weisheipl, 1964]: 
“Subtilis Swynyshed, proles Glastoniae, / Revera monachus bonae memoriae, / Cuius non periit 
fama industriae,/ Sinebat pauperes in pace vivere.”
48 [Spade, 1977: 257]: “Propter concessionem partium copulativae non est copulativa con-
cedenda nec propter concessionem disjunctivae est aliqua pars ejus concedenda.”
49 [Spade, 1980: §14 P. 45].
25
6.  ‘Not every man is running or you
are not a man’ 
Granted (equivalent to
the opposite of (5))
7.  ‘Not every man is running or you
are not a man, but you are a man,
so not every man is running’
Granted (since it is valid)
8.  ‘Not every man is running or you are
not a man, and you are a man’
Denied (inconsistent with the 
positum)
(1), (2) and (5) prove Swyneshed’s first thesis, and (6) his second thesis.
Swyneshed’s responsio nova differs from Burley’s responsio antiqua in 
several respects. First, Swyneshed, and the nova responsio in general, recog-
nises only positio, impositio and depositio. (As we saw, petitio and sit verum 
can be subsumed under positio.) Next, Swyneshed makes a sharp distinction 
between the positio and the positum (and in general, between the obligatio 
and the obligatum). Swyneshed also characterizes possible positio differently 
from Burley. Most importantly, he characterizes “relevance” differently. More-
over, responses to irrelevant propositions need not be for the same instant, but 
only for the present. Finally, he characterizes success and failure (winning 
and losing) differently.
According to Swyneshed’s rules for positio, the positum should be accept-
ed only if it is contingent, that is, if responses to it outside the obligation would 
change as the facts change. If a proposition follows from or is inconsistent 
with the positum (regardless of what has subsequently been granted or denied), 
it is said to be “relevant” (pertinens), otherwise “irrelevant” (impertinens). If 
it is relevant, it is “obligated” and should be granted if it follows, denied if it 
is inconsistent, and if it’s irrelevant, is not obligated and (in accord with the 
casus and how things are at that instant) should be granted if (known to be) 
true, provided that is not inconsistent with the positio (the obligatio), denied 
if (known to be) false, provided that is not inconsistent with the positio (the 
obligatio), and doubted if it is not known whether it is true or false. The ob-
ligation ends when either the Respondent grants and denies the same propo-
sition (unless it is irrelevant), or when the Opponent says ‘cedat tempus’.
The responsio nova deals with many of the apparent problems that we 
noted with Burley’s theory. Not every false proposition (compatible with the 
positum) need be granted: the “tricks” (cautelae) introduced by Burley no 
longer work, since they only require the false proposition to be granted be-
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cause it follows from the positum in conjunction with a true irrelevant propo-
sition which has been granted. Responses change only when the facts change: 
relevance is determined only by the positum and not by any irrelevant propo-
sitions subsequently proposed. Order does not affect responses: again, since 
relevance only looks back to the positum, it cannot depend on any subsequent 
responses or their order. Finally, the pragmatic inconsistency introduced by 
posita such as ‘Nothing is posited to you’ is excluded by treating them as ir-
relevant and evaluating them as if the positio never was.
Jennifer Ashworth [Ashworth, 1986] showed that each responsio had strong 
support in subsequent decades. The responsio antiqua was maintained by 
Ralph Strode, Albert of Saxony, John Wyclif, Richard Brinkley, William Bus-
er, Marsilius of Inghen, John of Holland, Peter of Mantua, Peter of Candia, 
and Paul of Venice; while the responsio nova was advocated by Robert Fland, 
Martinus Anglicus, the anonymous authors of the Tredecim questiones, a Com-
mentary on Marsilius, the Tres sunt modi, another Obligationes treatise, the 
secundum usum Oxonie, and Richard Lavenham. The majority of surviving 
treatises reject Swyneshed’s innovation. But his ideas still influenced those 
who rejected it.
9. Heresy or Orthodoxy?
How heretical is Swyneshed’s logic? Can a conjunction be false even 
though both its conjuncts are true? No: that is to confuse granting with being 
true, denial with being false: the Respondent may be obliged to grant a prop-
osition which is false (e.g., the positum). He may be obliged to deny a propo-
sition which is true (e.g., if it is incompatible with the positum). He may even 
be obliged to doubt a proposition (i.e., to say ‘I doubt it’) which he knows to 
be true or false, as we saw in § 6 above.
Mikko Yrjönsuuri [1993, P. 317] suggested a book-keeping metaphor to 
explain the logic involved in Swyneshed’s nova responsio. Catarina Dutilh 
Novaes [2006, P. 137] formalized Yrjönsuuri’s account. Let P + represent what 
is relevant and follows from the positum (pertinens sequens); let P − represent 
what is relevant and inconsistent with the positum (pertinens repugnans); and 
let I represent what is irrelevant (impertinens). She sets out the tables for con-
junction and disjunction as follows:
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φn P + P + P + P − P − I
φm P + P − I P − I I
φn ∧ φm P + P − I P − P − I
φn ∨ φm P + P + P + P − I I
Representing these as 3x3-matrices with some re-ordering, we obtain 
Kleene’s strong matrices:50
∨ P+ I P–
P+ P+ P+ P+
I P+ I I
P– P+ I P–             
∧ P+ I P–
P+ P+ I P–
I I I P–
P– P– P– P–
Thus a conjunction can be irrelevant, and so denied (when known to be 
false), although its conjuncts are, respectively, pertinens sequens (hence grant-
ed, though known to be false) and impertinens (irrelevant, hence granted, since 
known to be true). So Swyneshed’s logic is thoroughly orthodox, as are Kleene’s 
matrices. What Kleene was doing was showing how to combine partial infor-
mation, the output of partial functions. If we know a conjunct is false, we al-
ready know that the conjunction is false, but if one conjunct is unknown, the 
other true or unknown, the value of the conjunction is open. Kleene’s matri-
ces are regular in that, in the light of more information, no fixed value (true 
or false) will change, though indeterminacy may be determined one way or 
the other. Swyneshed’s analysis shares these characteristics. Irrelevant con-
juncts may be granted or denied in the light of external information, but that 
does not affect the response to the conjunction, which will also be irrelevant 
and so determined in the same way. But when the conjuncts are relevant, the 
conjunction will be denied if any conjunct should be denied, granted only if 
both are granted.
50 See [Kleene, 1952: § 64].
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10. Conclusion
The function of obligational disputations was to test students’ ability to 
handle logical inferences – to use logic in practice. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the very few texts which describe their function. It is not surprising 
that we have no record of any actual disputation: one doesn’t need to engage 
in these often short exchanges; just thinking about them trains one to think 
logically. Swyneshed’s responsio nova seems radical and iconoclastic, in, e.g., 
denying conjunctions both of whose conjuncts have been granted. But it is 
important to distinguish ‘true’ from ‘granted’, ‘false’ from ‘denied’, and ‘doubt-
ful’ from ‘doubted’, and when we do so, Swyneshed’s theory is thoroughly 
mainstream. Examination of the subtleties of obligational disputation shows 
that it does inculcate close attention to logical relationships. We see this prac-
tical training preserved in the use of obligational terminology in other logical 
treatises, e.g., on insolubles. Obligational disputations show logic at its most 
direct and realistic – as a practical discipline.
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Предметом исследования в статье является софизм, основанный на пропозиции «Это – 
Сократ». Он содержится в небольшом трактате о предписаниях, принадлежащем, как считает-
ся, Уильяму Гейтсбери. Прежде всего исследуется предыстория и контекст традиционной вер-
сии диспутов с предписаниями (responsio antiqua) у Вальтера Бурлея, затем анализируются 
возражения и поправки, предложенные Ричардом Килвингтоном и Роджером Суайнсхедом. Ха-
рактеризуются все шесть видов предписаний, описанных Бурлеем, включая sit verum, т.е. тот 
вид, который послужил основой для софизма. Килвингтону и Суайнсхеду претила динамич-
ность responsio antiqua, поэтому Килвингтон решил пересмотреть правила, в соответствии с 
которыми высказывание могло быть признано нерелевантным. Это позволило ему использо-
вать такой способ построения рассуждения который был несовместим с правилами Бурлея, – 
«диспутативный метааргумент». Гейтсбери не принял реформу Килвингтона и предполагаемый 
ею метааргумент. Суайнсхед также подверг пересмотру предложенную Бурлеем версию дис-
путов с предписаниями, сформулировав так называемую responsio nova, исходным пунктом 
которой является кажущееся парадоксальным положение: не следует принимать конъюнкцию, 
две части которой мы уже приняли. При ближайшем рассмотрении, однако, версия Суайнсхеда 
оказывается не столь радикальной, как казалось сначала. 
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